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Abstract
In the context of deteriorating relations with ‘Western’ states, Russia’s state-funded international 
broadcasters are often understood as malign propaganda rather than as agents of soft power. 
Subsequently, there is a major credibility gap between how Russian state media represents itself 
to the world and how it is actually perceived by overseas publics. However, based on the study 
of RT’s coverage of the Russian hosted FIFA 2018 World Cup and the audience reactions this 
prompted, we find that this credibility gap was partially bridged. By analysing over 700 articles 
published by RT, alongside social media and focus group research, we find that RT’s World Cup 
coverage created an unusually positive vision of Russia that appealed to international audiences. 
Our study demonstrates how state-funded international broadcaster coverage of sports mega-
events can generate a soft power effect with audiences, even when the host state – such as Russia 
– has a poor international reputation.
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Introduction
On 21 March 2018, in a Foreign Affairs Select Committee at the British Parliament, 
Member of Parliament Ian Austin articulated his concerns about the upcoming FIFA 
World Cup in Russia, suggesting that ‘Putin is going to use it in the way Hitler used the 
1936 Olympics’ (Austin quoted in Wintour, 2018). Austin was disquieted that the tour-
nament would be used to deflect public attention from human rights abuses in Russia 
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and its actions in Ukraine, Syria, and the United Kingdom, where the former Russian spy 
Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia had recently been poisoned. When asked what he 
thought about the upcoming tournament, the then British Foreign Secretary, Boris 
Johnson, stated that Austin’s comparison was ‘certainly right’ and that ‘Putin glorying in 
this sporting event’ was ‘an emetic prospect’ (Johnson quoted in Wintour, 2018). These 
comments reflect not only British elite attitudes towards the Russian state at the time but 
also a disdain at the prospect of Putin wielding influence by exploiting this sports mega-
event (SME).
Such accounts dovetail with the argument that the Kremlin is doing ‘the opposite of 
what is needed for soft power creation’, where instead of making Russia attractive to 
international audiences, Russia’s aggressive and controversial foreign and domestic poli-
cies result in negative and hostile perceptions abroad (Grix et al., 2019b: 54; see also 
Hudson, 2015). Russian state-sponsored campaigns to engage with international publics 
– public diplomacy – are increasingly viewed as propaganda rather than as a genuine 
effort to foster a productive dialogue (Van Herpen, 2015). Russia’s public diplomacy 
efforts therefore suffer from what Rawnsley (2015) has referred to as a ‘credibility gap’. 
Consequently, SMEs, conventionally envisioned as tools of national image promotion 
abroad, are primarily understood as instruments of domestic political legitimation in the 
context of contemporary Russia (Grix et al., 2019b; Orttung and Zhemukhov, 2017). Yet 
the question of the significance of international communication in the context of Russian 
SMEs should not be dismissed as categorically as it often is (Nye, 2014).
Existing academic research has produced some insights into how Russia has attempted 
to promote a favourable image to world audiences through its previous SME, the Sochi 
2014 Olympics (Grix and Kramareva, 2017; Hutchings et al., 2015; Kramareva and Grix, 
2018; Tenneriello, 2019). However, despite recent preliminary studies (Makarychev and 
Yatsyk, 2020), surprisingly little is known about Russian political communication efforts 
and their effects during the 2018 World Cup. This is with respect to (a) how Russian state 
actors engaged international audiences, (b) how these audiences interpreted Russia-
sponsored communication at the time of the SME, and (c) what effects such efforts may 
have had in shaping international perceptions of Russia.
In this article, we address this gap. We analyse how a Russian state-sponsored interna-
tional media network RT – formerly Russia Today – reported the 2018 World Cup and 
examine public reactions to this coverage. We choose to focus on RT because it is Russia’s 
foremost state-funded international broadcaster with an audience of millions across mul-
tiple new media platforms as well as on television across Europe, the Middle East, and 
North and South America. While this may not provide an overall sense of Russian soft 
power in its entirety, an analysis of RT’s media reporting and audience responses can 
provide an insight into how one of the most prominent ‘soft power tools’ or, in different 
interpretations, ‘propaganda weapons’ of the Russian state represents Russia to interna-
tional audiences (Hutchings, 2020: 284).
RT is often portrayed as a pariah among international broadcasters, yet the network 
confidently internalises and reappropriates this status (Yablokov, 2015), attracting diverse, 
albeit modest, international audiences (Mickiewicz, 2017). Rawnsley (2015: 276) observes 
that typically, the network’s ‘gaze is not on Russia, but rather is fixed on presenting a criti-
cal representation of the US rais[ing] serious doubts about its role in “public diplomacy” 
and suggest[ing] a more ideological and propaganda-based approach to international 
broadcasting’. At the time of the 2018 World Cup, RT’s usual tendency to focus on nega-
tive representations of Western institutions (Miazhevich, 2018) was replaced by salient 
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reporting of a Russian SME. Having no rights to broadcast the actual football matches, 
RT’s event coverage and the network’s English-language audiences’ reactions, therefore, 
present an intriguing case study to shed light on Russian political communication.
This study draws upon multiple original data sources to understand how RT repre-
sented the 2018 World Cup. Through a thematic analysis of over 700 articles RT pub-
lished on their dedicated World Cup website (RT.com/fifa2018) during the tournament, 
we explore how RT represented Russia. We also discern how international audiences 
interpreted and responded to RT’s representation of Russia by analysing the social media 
engagement with RT’s articles, alongside data collected through a month-long digital 
discussion group with 47 participants and follow-up interviews with 15 of those. In doing 
so, we ask, how did RT represent Russia through its coverage of the World Cup to global 
audiences? And how did audiences interpret and respond to such representations?
This article contributes to our understanding of Russian public diplomacy, interna-
tional broadcasting, and soft power more broadly, in several ways. First, it provides an 
empirical account of how a Russian state-sponsored international broadcaster represented 
the host country to international audiences during the World Cup. Second, our article 
expands our understanding of how audiences of RT interpreted Russian public diplomacy 
efforts. The study of audiences has often been overlooked in analyses of soft power, and 
we heed Barr et al.’s (2015: 215) call ‘to explore the ways in which consumers confirm or 
resist official narratives’. Our study draws upon ethnographic approaches to audience 
studies (Gillespie, 2006) and recent attempts to analyse ‘everyday narratives of politics’ 
(Stanley and Jackson, 2016) by using focus group and interview methods (Barbour, 2008; 
Stanley, 2016). As studies have recently demonstrated the heterogeneity and fragmented 
nature of RT’s international audience (Crilley et al., 2020), we emphasise that this study 
is a focused insight into how an English-speaking audience with a common interest in 
football and politics responded to RT’s English-language coverage of the World Cup. 
Nonetheless, our study demonstrates how to integrate audience research into the study of 
public diplomacy and soft power.
SMEs as sites of public diplomacy and soft power
Traditionally, soft power refers to a state’s ability to influence others in international poli-
tics through ‘attraction rather than coercion’ (Nye, 2008: 94). According to Grix and Lee 
(2013: 526), soft power can be understood as ‘a discursive mechanism for increased 
agency in global affairs through the performative politics of attraction’. Public diplomacy 
refers to a set of instruments at governments’ disposal, including international broadcast-
ing, cultural exchanges, and SMEs, used ‘to mobilise . . . [soft power] resources to com-
municate with and attract the publics of other countries’ (Nye, 2008: 95; see also Cull, 
2008), and consequently to enhance their ability to wield more tangible international 
influence. This understanding draws attention to the cultural and communicative founda-
tions of soft power, and the tools used by states and the actors they employ to make them-
selves and their actions more tangible and attractive to others (Barr et al., 2015).
International broadcasting plays an increasingly important role in enhancing the spon-
soring state’s soft power ‘by generating credibility, fostering values [. . .] changing 
behaviour, and increasing goodwill’ (Pamment, 2014: 53). Unlike traditional public 
diplomacy, characterised by a one-way flow of preferred messages about a state, public 
diplomacy today is understood as a two-way flow of communication, whereby state-
sponsored actors actively listen to and establish a dialogue with external publics 
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(Pamment, 2014). The issue of credibility of international broadcasting outputs is espe-
cially salient for states such as Russia, as it ‘is the single most important factor in deter-
mining whether or not a particular broadcast will be interpreted as propaganda or public 
diplomacy’ (Rawnsley, 2015: 274). The success of soft power or public diplomacy initia-
tives, including international broadcasting, could be dependent on whether they pass what 
Brannagan and Giulianotti (2018: 1151) refer to as the ‘credible attraction filter’: in 
essence, a test of whether the efforts and outputs are indeed deemed attractive, credible, 
and trustworthy by their international audiences.
In the past decade, a growing number of rising powers have hosted SMEs in order ‘to 
bolster their “image” and international “prestige”’ (Grix, 2015: 19; see also Cornelissen, 
2010). Hosting these events is said to engender a ‘“feel-good” factor’ (Grix, 2015: 7) that 
states can use to ‘deflect domestic tensions’ (Tomlinson and Young, 2006: 1) and draw 
attention away from negative issues such as bad governance, human rights abuses, and 
conflicts. Through the use of international broadcasting, states can represent their SMEs 
in favourable ways and produce the effect of an in-person visit to audiences, which can 
contribute to a state’s soft power (Rowe, 2004). However, others have acknowledged the 
possibility of the opposite effect – ‘soft disempowerment’ – where such efforts instead 
‘upset, offend or alienate others, leading to a loss of attractiveness or influence’ (Brannagan 
and Giulianotti, 2015: 706). If international audiences are not persuaded by the credibility 
of a state’s efforts to make themselves attractive, their attempts to generate soft power can 
in fact backfire and lead to disempowerment. This has been the case with Qatar, whose 
hosting of the 2022 World Cup has drawn attention to the state’s human rights record, 
‘leading audiences to question the state’s integrity and adding further to its perceived lack 
of credibility’ (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018: 1156). Similarly, the concerns expressed 
by UK officials prior to the 2018 World Cup illustrate the reputational risks associated 
with hosting such events.
Audiences, soft power, and SMEs
Much of the current research on soft power lacks a sufficient theorisation or empirical 
study of audiences (Fisher, 2020; Gillespie and Nieto McAvoy, 2016), despite the audi-
ence being pivotal to the success and effect of soft power efforts. As audiences are often 
seen as homogeneous, passive groups, receiving and interpreting state messages uncriti-
cally, there is scant research into how audiences make sense of, interpret, and feel about 
soft power initiatives. Indeed, as Barr et al. (2015: 215) have suggested, scholars ‘need to 
better understand the motivation of those who consume soft power narratives and prod-
ucts’. Therefore, in our research, we place audiences at centre stage by adopting an 
approach inspired by cultural studies and audience studies. Soft power is reliant on audi-
ences being ‘active contributors’ (Gillespie and Nieto McAvoy, 2016: 205–207) in deter-
mining the efficacy of public diplomacy initiatives. This is because, for a state’s image to 
be improved, an audience has to interpret and accept the positive projection of a state’s 
image. Only then can soft disempowerment be avoided and the credibility gap bridged. 
As Rawnsley (2015: 284) highlights, ‘the “power” in soft power ultimately resides with 
the audience’ – they have to decide whether a soft power initiative is worth engaging with 
in the first place, and then they have to accept and act upon the communicated message 
(see also Cheskin, 2017; Szostek, 2018).
A corollary of the limited account of the audience in studies of soft power is an insuf-
ficient understanding of how emotions shape the success of soft power initiatives. If we 
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are interested in how SMEs prompt a ‘“feel-good” factor’ (Grix, 2015: 7), then we are 
ultimately concerned with the politics of emotion. For Solomon (2014), soft power initia-
tives do not have political significance because of the words and images they use, but 
rather because of how they make audiences feel. If we are to understand the ‘soft power 
of attraction’ (Nye, 2008: 101), then the study of emotions ‘must be brought into analys-
ing attractiveness’ (Solomon, 2014: 736). This requires two conceptual steps. First, we 
need to understand how soft power initiatives elicit emotions in those who view and 
engage with them (see Ahmed, 2014: 1), because international media ‘evoke feelings and 
affects, which in turn help to shape how one perceives of and belongs in the world’ 
(Hutchison, 2016: 19). Second, if audiences ‘play a role in shaping global media events 
as co-creators of meanings’ (Burchell et al., 2015: 415), then we need to understand how 
state-sponsored international broadcasters represent SMEs and the emotional responses 
such representations generate.
‘A brilliant surprise’: International media and the 2018 FIFA World Cup
Despite critical accounts of previous soft power efforts led by the Kremlin (Nye, 2014; 
Rutland and Kazantsev, 2016) and the noted antagonism towards the Russia-hosted 2018 
World Cup prior to and shortly after its commencement (e.g. Dawson, 2018), the post-
event media reports did not bear out such scepticism. The Guardian journalist Barney 
Ronay (2018a: xvii) noted upon completion of the tournament that ‘Russia itself was a 
brilliant surprise in so many ways’. Despite deteriorating relations between Russia and 
the West, during the tournament and after it, ‘it became a reflex to describe Russia 2018 
as perhaps the best World Cup ever [. . .] a brilliant [event], epic in scale and relentless in 
its drama, five weeks that seemed to stand outside of everything else around it’ (Ronay, 
2018a: 225). The 2018 World Cup went from being widely viewed as an impending catas-
trophe to being seen as one of the best tournaments arranged by the ‘perfect hosts’ 
(Jennings, 2018). This sentiment was shared by journalists and commentators from across 
the political spectrum in the United Kingdom: from The Times (Whittell, 2018), the BBC, 
and The Independent (Cawthorne, 2018; Jennings, 2018) to The Guardian, all of which 
are often critical towards contemporary Russian politics. A host of other mainstream 
international publications also featured positive reflections on the tournament (Muraviev, 
2018; Rogers, 2018). Ronay (2018a: 83), for example, concluded:
plenty of nations have used the World Cup to placate the people, to build soft power, to legitimize 
a regime. For this tournament Putin scrubbed the cities, presented a face, ensured that we saw 
what he wanted us to. It was an exceptional piece of stage management, willingly absorbed and 
enjoyed by those present. (Ronay, 2018a: 83)
Such a change in favourable perceptions of Russia appears surprising: why were the 
audiences of this campaign ‘willingly absorbed’ by it when other Russian public diplo-
macy efforts, such as the Sochi Games, were deemed less effective by audiences?
Content analysis and audience research: Mixing methods
Our study employed several data sources and methods. We collected tweets published by 
RT’s main Twitter account (@RT_Com) in June and July 2018, when the World Cup took 
place. RT published 7714 tweets in this period, of which 17% (1132) were on the topic of 
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the World Cup, highlighting that this was a major media event for the network even 
though it did not broadcast the matches. We thematically analysed all of the 776 news 
items published on RT’s dedicated World Cup website, RT.com/fifa2018, in the same 
period. These stories provide the official RT coverage of the World Cup and demonstrate 
how RT represented the Russian nation, culture, and people through the tournament. RT’s 
articles were inductively coded and then analysed according to their main themes 
(Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2012). These have subsequently been assigned into 
broader categories: football, culture, fans, and politics.
We then used the social media analytics tool CrowdTangle to understand how audi-
ences engaged with and interpreted RT’s coverage. At the time of the study, CrowdTangle 
calculated the total number of audience interactions – likes, shares, comments, tweets, 
retweets, and replies – from social media posts that included the URL to each RT article 
on the social media platforms Facebook, Twitter, reddit, and Instagram. However, as 
viewing and social media engagement figures ‘tell us nothing about how audiences 
respond to the programmes they watch, nor if their attitudes or behaviour towards the 
source have changed as a consequence of engaging with its international broadcasting’ 
(Rawnsley, 2015: 283), we then conducted further research through a digital discussion 
group with 47 participants hosted throughout the tournament and follow-up interviews 
with 15 of these (we discuss these approaches in more detail in the next two sections). 
Following the tournament, we also conducted a short interview with Daniel Armstrong 
(2020, Interview), a sports reporter, who covered it for RT, to triangulate our observations 
with the experiences of a member of the team who wrote some of the stories we investi-
gated. Overall, this mixed-methods approach allowed us to capture the dynamics of both 
RT’s creation of representations of Russia and their reception by its international audi-
ences during the World Cup, and link these with the wider discussion of Russian public 
diplomacy.
RT’s representation of Russia throughout the World Cup
Compared with its reporting of the Sochi Olympics, which was multi-pronged yet lacked 
world-class expertise and appeal (Kazakov, 2019), RT’s coverage of the 2018 World Cup 
reflected a higher level of investment and effort to reach a wide audience. RT temporarily 
employed world-famous football personalities like José Mourinho, Peter Schmeichel, and 
Stan Collymore to provide tournament commentary and lead thematic shows introducing 
Russia as the World Cup host (RT, 2018b,2018c, 2018e). Such programming drew praise 
from Western football commentators: ‘it turns out the real genius of RT [. . .] is its unex-
pected tone and texture. It’s actually good!’, wrote Ronay (2018b). The tactic of employ-
ing ‘celebrity diplomats’ (Cooper, 2015) to speak on behalf of the Russia-sponsored 
tournament was an important part of RT’s effort to tell the story of the World Cup.
Mediating the experiences and opinions of well-known foreigners complemented the 
‘citizen diplomacy’ (Mueller, 2008) of RT, which centred on fan experiences in Russia. 
RT’s World Cup website aggregated their news coverage of the tournament, shared match 
results, and provided guides to the host cities. It also featured an audience content co-cre-
ation function called ‘the footwall’, which shared social media images and videos from 
fans in Russia and aimed to bring the experience to international observers in real time. 
Described as ‘the next-best thing to being here’, this feature manifested RT’s desire to 
deliver the effect of an in-person visit to international viewers (Grix, 2015; Rowe, 2004).
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Our analysis of the 776 articles published on RT’s World Cup website suggests that the 
channel covered the tournament through four broad themes. The first theme consisted of 
football-related articles (371, 48% of all articles), including news about teams and play-
ers, match predictions, and reports. The second consisted of articles broadly focused on 
culture (152, 20% of all articles). Such stories introduced aspects of Russian culture and 
traditions, covering cultural performances, arts, and celebrities at the tournament. These 
stories also shared information about host cities and stadia. The third revolved around 
fans (146, 19% of all articles), including stories about visiting supporters’ experiences in 
Russia, spectators following the tournament from abroad, social media reactions, and 
‘footwall’ content. Finally, the fourth theme involved articles that were explicitly about 
politics (107, 14% of all articles). These stories commented on diplomatic relations 
between countries and shared updates on the national leaders present at, or commenting 
on, the tournament.
Overall, just under half of RT’s coverage of the World Cup was explicitly about the 
sporting dimension. Even at a time of such a high-profile tournament hosted in Russia, 
the SME-focused portal of the network, which did not have broadcast rights to the games, 
maintained its informational remit. Yet the prevalence of such stories did not mean the 
network abandoned its ‘counter-hegemonic’ (Hutchings et al., 2015) critique of Western 
media and institutions in its World Cup reporting. For instance, the RT journalist we inter-
viewed noted that RT actively engaged with and responded to the negative commentary 
the tournament had received in the foreign media. RT was ‘keen on pick[ing] on some of 
the untruths being reported [. . .] It wasn’t our sole goal, but it was obviously a factor in 
some of our reporting’ (Armstrong, 2020, Interview). Such stories (e.g. RT, 2018a) 
formed part of the network’s international coverage of the tournament, mirroring its mode 
of reporting on the Sochi Games (Hutchings et al., 2015; Kazakov, 2019).
Situating fans and their experiences, making a virtue out of necessity as RT could not 
actually broadcast the games, also created a distinctive approach to the network’s cover-
age and helped generate a powerful affective response. In addition, the reporting of fan 
experiences and cultural stories flouted expectations among many who thought RT would 
simply focus on a political line. Referred to by the Russian foreign minister Sergey 
Lavrov as ‘people’s diplomacy’ (RT, 2018d), RT’s focus on fan experiences was one of 
the main pillars of the network’s approach to broadcasting the tournament that helped 
generate soft power effects. Our RT interviewee explained that:
We had a big responsibility, we felt, to get in touch with fans and share the fan experiences [. . .] 
When I was in the field, I reported what I saw [. . . and] everybody with whom I spoke had 
positive stories to tell. (Armstrong, 2020, Interview)
Reporting fan impressions and re-mediating content from foreign fans’ own accounts 
captured fan voices and experiences, and aimed to bridge the gap of perceptions of the 
tournament and its host among international audiences. This tactic was key in ensuring 
RT’s efforts passed the credible attraction filter. It helped to emphasise that foreign and 
Russian fans had a ‘shared understanding of the cultural norms, beliefs and values that 
establish the very meaning of attraction’ (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018: 1151), while 
the foreign fans’ voices and images corroborated the Russian media’s reporting, thereby 
promoting its credibility. In addition, RT’s coverage involved an emphasis on framing the 
tournament as a success story by highlighting that international footballers, managers, 
and pundits were surprised and impressed by the Russian hosts of the World Cup and their 
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encounters with the Russian public. Such messaging aimed to generate favourable repre-
sentations of Russia as a host of an on-going, well-organised SME.
Another notable aspect of RT’s coverage was its favourable representation of President 
Putin. RT tended to showcase him being friendly with other world leaders, footballers, 
and celebrities. All these features are similar to RT’s approach to coverage of the Sochi 
Olympics, in which Putin served as one of the key national symbols of contemporary 
Russia (Kazakov, 2019). Although RT has often framed Putin as a disruptive ‘strongman’ 
in global politics (Beale, 2018), their World Cup coverage shifted representations to 
depict him as a welcoming and cooperative world leader.
Ultimately, RT’s representation of Russia attempted to ‘normalise’ Russian people, 
culture, and politics, and present Russia as a modern, outward-looking nation acting in 
cooperation with other states and publics, just as it did in 2014 during the Sochi Games 
(Gronskaya and Makarychev, 2014; Kazakov, 2019). Echoing RT’s practice of employing 
foreign journalists – not only to connect more directly with audiences but also ‘to rein-
force [its] respectability and legitimacy’ (Rawnsley, 2015: 284) – RT’s World Cup cover-
age took advantage of the unprecedented number of foreign football celebrities and fans 
flocking to Russia as an opportunity to emphasise this point. RT projected a warm and 
hospitable image of the nation and emphasised that both the Russian people and the state, 
personified by Putin himself, embody and endorse universal values (Grix et al., 2019a) 
and, in fact, have much in common with overseas audiences.
Interpreting RT’s representation of Russia
To gauge public interest in RT’s representation of Russia during the World Cup, we cal-
culated the audience interaction figures on social media for the relevant articles. Football-
related stories resulted in the most audience interaction overall (281,843 responses), with 
political articles a close second (269,105 responses). Individual articles that concerned 
politics gained, on average, over three times the number of interaction than football-
related articles, suggesting that RT audiences had a heightened interest in political rather 
than sporting matters (Table 1).
These figures shed light on RT’s audiences during the World Cup. Despite considera-
ble efforts for internationally appealing sporting coverage – such as the employment of 
internationally renowned experts – it was still political matters rather than sport or cul-
tural issues that prompted, on average, the most social media engagement with RT’s 
World Cup output. Further to this, Table 2 summarises details about the top 10 most popu-
lar RT World Cup articles, collated and sorted based on the number of social media inter-
actions they generated.










Politics 107 14 269,105 2515
Culture 152 20 141,609 932
Fans 146 19 100,431 688
Football 371 48 281,843 760
Total 776 100% 792,988 1022
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A common feature of these stories is that they all centre on actions or opinions of politi-
cal and football celebrities, suggesting that RT’s use of celebrity diplomacy bore fruit. The 
role of Putin as a national icon of Russia and a celebrity personifying the host country was 
obvious: as the table shows, half of the most engaged-with stories deal with updates from 
or about him. Rather than the Russian people, host cities, or sporting or cultural outputs, it 
was the Russian President who spurred the most notable levels of user interactions on 
social media. Putin’s international, controversial cultural icon status (Goscilo, 2013) 
appears to have drawn people to engage with RT’s World Cup coverage. In response to the 
most popular RT World Cup article in our study, commentors on Facebook stated that 
‘Putin is always a winner!’, ‘Putin what a gentleman’, and ‘I’d rather swap [Theresa] May 
for Putin and make Britain an Empire again’. These comments, alongside reflections such 
as ‘Russia served the game and all visiting nations and football supporters handsomely’, 
suggest that RT’s followers recognised Putin as a prominent element of Russia’s interna-
tional image. Moreover, as with comments responding to RT’s broader media reportage 
(Crilley and Chatterje-Doody, 2020: 725–728), audiences indicate an attachment to the 
identity of Putin as a strong, masculine figure who can achieve his goals – whether they be 
making a country ‘great again’ or hosting an SME. Similarly, some of the other most reso-
nant stories demonstrate that hiring internationally renowned pundits, like Mourinho and 
Schmeichel, resulted in engagement from RT’s audiences.
Finally, the tendency to focus on viral, humorous, potentially controversial content, 
such as Pogba’s trolling of English fans and Maradona’s eccentric behaviour as well as 
Internet responses to it, extends RT’s usual practice of attempting to provoke an emo-
tional reaction from audiences, thus boosting online discussion and viewership (Chatterje-
Doody and Crilley, 2019; Miazhevich, 2018). RT journalists confirmed that the sports 
desk, both during the World Cup and beyond it, would aim not only to break the news to 
their audiences as quickly as possible, but also to ‘write our [stories] in a way that would 
get our audience to interact’ (Armstrong, 2020, Interview). Sharing content that is humor-
ous, controversial, and generated by or relating to celebrities and cultural icons of a nation 
and framing it in purposefully affective ways were some of the techniques through which 
RT spurred an emotional response among its viewers and followers.
Insights from RT’s World Cup audiences
To better understand how audiences interpreted RT’s representation of Russia, we con-
ducted a digital focus group on Facebook and follow-up interviews with research partici-
pants. Participants were recruited through requests on our research project’s website and 
social media channels for participants interested in football and politics to take part in a 
study of RT’s World Cup coverage. In total, we had 47 participants, the majority of whom 
were male (36 compared to 11 females), and from a diverse range of ages, locations 
(although most were British), and personal backgrounds. As such, we do not claim that 
this group is representative of a general population or of a general RT audience, given that 
no such general audience exists (Ang, 1991). Instead, following other research in the age 
of the ‘hybrid media system’ (Chadwick, 2017), our digital focus group and follow-up 
interviews provide detailed insights into how some audience members actively followed 
and engaged with RT’s broadcast and social media outputs throughout the tournament.
The majority of our participants were aware of RT but did not watch it regularly or 
engage with it online. During the tournament, we asked participants to engage with RT on 
a daily basis and to share news articles about the political and cultural dimensions of the 
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World Cup (as opposed to match reports or football-related news) and to actively com-
ment on posts and engage with one another in our private Facebook discussion group. 
Over the course of the tournament, they published a total of 227 posts and comments in 
our discussion group. Of these, 81 posts linked to media articles alongside a group mem-
ber’s commentary on them, and the other 146 comments were responses to these posts. 
Having contacted group members on the phone or via video calls beforehand, we are 
confident that none of the participants were fake accounts, bots, or in the employ of RT or 
the Russian state. Therefore, the posts and comments that participants shared in our 
Facebook discussion group provide an insight into how RT’s World Cup coverage was 
interpreted by external observers and reveal how RT’s reporting was situated alongside 
other media sources that our participants engaged with throughout the tournament.
After the tournament, to generate further insights, we conducted small-group, fol-
low-up interviews with our study participants. We invited all 47 participants to these 
interviews and conducted in-person or online video interviews with 15 participants who 
were the most active members. These interviews were qualitative, semi-structured con-
versations aimed at understanding the interviewees’ points of view and lived experi-
ences of the World Cup (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009). Participants were asked questions 
concerning (a) the media sources they used to follow the World Cup, (b) the main 
events/stories of the World Cup 2018, (c) how Russia was portrayed through media 
coverage before, during and after the tournament, and (d) specific questions about RT’s 
World Cup coverage. This last point was the focus of our discussions, and we structured 
our interviews around these questions: what did RT’s coverage focus on? How did RT 
represent Russia? How did RT impact your perceptions of Russia? To what extent did 
you think RT’s coverage was fair and accurate? Our conversations provided us with 
rich insights building on the comments that participants shared on Facebook and ena-
bled them to elaborate and reflect on the thoughts they had previously shared with oth-
ers. Three main areas of discussion in response to RT’s World Cup coverage arose 
during our audience research.
Expectations versus reality: ‘Scare stories in the media’
First, there was a prominent debate around public and media expectations before the 
tournament compared to what actually happened during the World Cup. Prior to the kick-
off, our research participants were worried about Russian racism and hooliganism, echo-
ing the concerns expressed by Western politicians and journalists (Kazakov, 2018). 
However, they noted that these concerns were perhaps overblown. One respondent com-
mented that ‘the Western (mainly UK) media love a football hooligan, problem is the 
majority of incidents always contain many of our own fans’.1 Another noted, ‘I think that 
there’s a tendency for scare stories in the media regardless of where the tournament is to 
be held’. Some participants acknowledged that the decision to host the World Cup in 
Russia was mired in controversy and shaped by FIFA’s corruption. Nonetheless, most 
participants ultimately felt it was fine for Russia to host the tournament; one said, ‘the 
World Cup is a celebration of bringing cultures together and we should thank Russia for 
opening their doors’.
Most discussants were surprised that the World Cup was a success that passed without 
any high-profile scandals or hooliganism. This indicates a sense of credible attraction in 
our participants who were originally sceptical of, and then pleasantly surprised by, 
Russia’s hosting of the tournament. Two participants noted:
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A:  We’re all slightly scared of Russia, and stories of Russia being scary go down 
well. . .
B:  We’ve always been told Russia is the enemy, and that’s why I enjoyed this World 
Cup, seeing Russians having fun . . .
Such responses revealed the respondents’ understanding that through the World Cup, 
Russia can flout expectations arising from prior cultural, media, and historical accounts. 
RT’s persistent challenge of ‘Western’ representations of Russia throughout its tourna-
ment coverage made participants reflect on the ways various media conventionally por-
tray Russia. Although participants viewed RT as presenting ‘Russia’s narrative’, they still 
found it a trustworthy source of news about the World Cup.
‘Ordinary’ Russia: ‘Russia isn’t a country of Putins’
Despite the prominence of Putin in RT’s most popular reports from the World Cup, our 
interview participants were not invested in, or attracted to, the figure of Putin. They 
thought Putin was ‘using the World Cup as part of his charm offensive’ and that ‘he has 
an agenda’ where he was ‘aiming to put Russia on the world stage’. In contrast, the sec-
ond key topic in our interview discussions was RT’s representation of encounters between 
the Russian public and foreigners. Participants assessed that ‘big sporting events are 
about people not governments’ and that media reporting of SMEs in neo-authoritarian 
states like Russia was ‘ultimately about the joy that sport can bring [. . .] it’s only by 
accommodating these repressive regimes – that we get to shine a light not only on the bad 
but the good [. . .] we return to the humanity of the people on the ground’.
Participants were positive in their outlook that the World Cup could improve relations 
between Russia and the West. As the tournament progressed, RT’s focus on fan experi-
ences became more noticed by our respondents: one person claimed they liked that RT’s 
coverage ‘centred on the football fans’. Another stated, ‘there is a lot of light fan/social 
media-based articles [. . .] it is an opportunity to show all the different sides of Russia that 
those in the West don’t normally see’.
In discussing the ‘footwall’ content on RT’s website, one participant pointed out that 
part of such user-generated content prominently featured images of LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and queer or questioning) fans, stating that ‘[it is] interesting that 
they have a post from the [. . .] Gay circuit given [Russia’s] anti-“gay propaganda” stance’, 
defying pre-tournament expectations. In response, another interviewee commented:
For me this World Cup has been such a great opportunity for the world to see that Russia is of 
course full of loads of wonderful, happy people – just like everywhere else! Too often we portray 
the mindset of a country’s leaders onto its innocent population – Russia isn’t a country of Putins! 
Obviously, there are some bad eggs in Russia (just like in every country) but the British media 
has had us believe that everyone in Russia is a massive racist homophobe!
These responses showcase the participants’ agency and active evaluation – often 
expressed in emotive ways – of the prominent narratives associated with Russia, as well 
as their expectations of what tournament coverage on a state-sponsored channel might 
involve. Such reflections also uncover that RT’s coverage of ‘ordinary’ Russia and 
Russians piqued the audiences’ interest. Moreover, in the view of the RT journalist we 
spoke to, even trivial stories of day-to-day positive experiences of foreign fans in 
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Russia made a difference in international perceptions of Russia among viewers abroad 
(Armstrong, 2020, Interview).
However, such coverage did not result in uniform levels of enthusiasm. One partici-
pant, for example, felt that the focus on the fan experience was excessive in its portrayal 
of normality: ‘Everything is normal. Nothing weird is going on’, and the coverage ‘was 
like CCTV; boring’. Nevertheless, central to our participants’ discussions were comments 
that it was ‘refreshing’ to see ‘ordinary Russians’ having fun. These comments illustrate 
that state-sponsored efforts to normalise the country – as a people, a culture, and political 
entity – through both the organisation of the World Cup and their international broadcast-
ing of this event were effective during the tournament. Participants felt that they gained 
an insight into the life of ‘normal Russians’ and that the World Cup improved relations 
between Russians and people elsewhere.
Emotions and the ‘beautiful game’: The success of the tournament and RT
Finally, our participants addressed the outcomes of RT’s reporting and the success of the 
tournament itself, as well as its implications for Russia’s international image. The quality 
of RT’s coverage was met with a range of reflections. At times, participants found it 
humorous, especially when RT published articles making jokes about Western concerns 
about hooliganism. For example, in response to an RT article headlined ‘England fans 
attacked in Volgograd! . . . by swarms of tiny flying midges’, one participant stated, ‘This 
is funny  1-0 Russian media!’ They reacted in exactly the kind of emotive and approving 
fashion RT sought to prompt – both in terms of the response’s content and style – thus 
illustrating this respondent’s ‘affective investment’ (Solomon, 2014) in RT’s framing.
Participants also pointed out that RT published some news stories that were seemingly 
critical of Russian laws or reported on sexual assault cases at the tournament, thus giving 
credence to RT’s reporting as ‘balanced’, at least to some degree. At the other end of the 
spectrum, however, several participants felt that some of RT’s coverage ‘feels a bit OTT 
[Over The Top]’, ‘relentlessly cheery – to the point where it could have come from the 
central office of information in Moscow’, and ‘Pure PR/propaganda’. Such comments 
suggest that some of RT’s content did not manage to overcome the credibility gap of 
Russian international broadcasting.
The issue of the quality of the tournament itself – both from organisational and sport-
ing perspectives – became prominent in our participants’ discussions. The positive recep-
tion of the World Cup as a sporting event dovetailed with some of our participants’ 
opinion that it had an auspicious impact on Russian and Western relations. One suggested 
that ‘the quality of the football is overcoming the divisiveness of politicians, and Russians 
have been welcoming. Have to say that, so far, it’s been a good WC for Russia’. The suc-
cess of the Russian national team at the tournament was also deemed significant:
yesterday’s win was a victory for Putin and a riposte to UK criticism of Russia. By beating 
Spain, the Russian team has surpassed all expectations [. . .] No doubt the high quality and 
unpredictable nature of many games is a key factor in the positive evaluation.
The soft power effect of RT’s World Cup coverage was described by one participant as 
a ‘hit in the stomach of the west’ given how, as another responded, an ‘unexpected feel-
good factor’ and ‘a very harmonious image [of Russia]’ emerged after the tournament in 
the minds of international audiences. Through their coverage of the competition, RT 
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surprised many of our participants and ‘came across as more credible than I thought it 
would be. . . . I thought it was going to be mindless propaganda’. In this way, one partici-
pant felt that ‘by not doing propaganda, they had the best propaganda’. These reflections 
serve as evidence of the situational success of RT’s coverage in passing the credible 
attraction filter: RT’s efforts were deemed trustworthy and credible by these audience 
members, who directly reported their change of perceptions of both the network and 
Russia as host of the tournament.
Subsequently, the excitement about a captivating football tournament together with its 
smooth organisation and the unexpectedly impressive performance of the Russian 
national team were all deemed by our respondents to be important in making Russia look 
attractive. RT’s coverage of the tournament and a general lack of negative stories and 
scandals served as a factor that bridged the credibility gap of Russian public diplomacy 
during the World Cup. Our data suggest that this was achieved by involving RT’s interna-
tional audiences and visitors to Russia in the co-creation of favourable messaging, allow-
ing tournament viewers to ‘willingly absorb and enjoy’ the spectacle (Ronay, 2018a), 
while in the process dispelling misconceptions of Russia and Russians alike.
Conclusion
Our findings challenge observations that Russian state-sponsored public diplomacy activ-
ities fail to ‘demonstrate any tangible evidence of furthering dialogue with their audi-
ences’ (Rawnsley, 2015: 274). During the tournament, RT promoted a feel-good factor 
around the SME by encouraging international visitors, as well as renowned football 
experts employed as celebrity diplomats, to co-create and co-share the story of Russia 
2018. Their reports painted a picture of a welcoming, unthreatening, and ‘normal’ Russia 
to the world, which was hosting one of the most successful and enjoyable tournaments of 
its kind. Such accounts were remediated by RT to international observers to ensure those 
who could not attend the event could still feel a part of it. RT’s reports also focused on 
defying Western criticisms and scepticism in a variety of ways, capitalised on the contro-
versial status of Putin, and were often framed in a purposefully emotive fashion: all fea-
tures recognisable in RT’s broader broadcasting practices (Crilley and Chatterje-Doody, 
2020).
Our study finds an unusually complimentary and receptive reaction to RT. This was 
buttressed by a set of favourable circumstances including a trouble-free, captivating, and 
inherently exhilarating event and a lack of interference from unwelcome hard power 
developments (Grix et al., 2019a). Our respondents reported largely favourable impres-
sions of the tournament itself, Russia as its host, and RT’s mediation, concurring with 
positive post-tournament accounts by international journalists (Cawthorne, 2018; 
Jennings, 2018; Ronay, 2018b; Whittell, 2018). The 2018 World Cup created a favourable 
perception of Russia and its tournament, which surprised many who expected that the 
event would come short of passing the credible attraction filter and result in soft disem-
powerment for the host state. Our analysis points to sentiments of improved trust in, and 
enjoyment of, RT’s output, simultaneously hinting at a bridging of the credibility gap of 
Russian public diplomacy.
The longevity of such effects, however, still needs to be studied over an extended 
period. Bridging the credibility gap of public diplomacy efforts and the generation of a 
feel-good factor among international observers at the time of a high-profile but ultimately 
short-term World Cup are not automatically indicative of sweeping changes in long-term 
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international perceptions of states like Russia. The attitudes of individual audience mem-
bers towards Russia evolved over the duration of the SME, and some of our participants 
contested the idyllic image of the event portrayed by RT as ‘boring’ and ‘propaganda-
like’. The twin consideration of mediated outputs and their interpretation by audiences, 
even after the events in question conclude, needs to be an on-going concern for scholars 
of political communication in order to better understand the immediate and long-term 
implications of SMEs.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article: This work was supported by the AHRC under Grant No. AH/P00508X/1.
ORCID iD
Rhys Crilley  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1816-5535
Note
1. Direct quotations from the focus group and digital interview participants are anonymised and presented 
henceforth as they were written.
References
Ahmed S (2014) Cultural Politics of Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Ang I (1991) Desperately Seeking the Audience. London: Routledge.
Barbour R (2008) Doing Focus Groups. 1st edn. London: SAGE.
Barr M, Feklyunina V and Theys S (2015) Introduction: The soft power of hard states. Politics 35(3–4): 213–215.
Beale M (2018) Brand Putin: An analysis of Vladimir Putin’s projected images. Defence Strategic 
Communications 5(5): 129–169.
Boyatzis RE (1998) Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development. London: 
SAGE.
Brannagan PM and Giulianotti R (2015) Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar, global sport and foot-
ball’s 2022 World Cup finals. Leisure Studies 34(6): 703–719.
Brannagan PM and Giulianotti R (2018) The soft power–soft disempowerment nexus: the case of Qatar. 
International Affairs 94(5): 1139–1157.
Braun V and Clarke V (2012) Thematic analysis. In: Cooper H, Camic PM, Long DL, et al (eds) APA Handbooks 
in Psychology®. APA handbook of research methods in psychology, Vol. 2. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association, pp. 57–71.
Burchell K, O’Loughlin B, Gillespie M, et al. (2015) Soft power and its audiences: Tweeting the Olympics from 
London 2012 to Sochi 2014. Participations: Journal of Audience & Reception Studies 12(1): 413–437.
Cawthorne A (2018) The World Cup helped Russia put on its best face – and the world smiled back. The 
Independent, 14July. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup/world-cup-
2018-russia-best-pictures-fans-video-fifa-vladimir-putin-a8443636.html (accessed 23 March 2020).
Chadwick A (2017) The Hybrid Media System : Politics and Power (Oxford studies in digital politics Book, 
Whole). 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chatterje-Doody PN and Crilley R (2019) Making sense of emotions and affective investments in war: RT and 
the Syrian conflict on YouTube. Media and Communication 7(3): 167–178.
Cooper AF (2015) Celebrity Diplomacy. London: Routledge.
Cornelissen S (2010) The geopolitics of global aspiration: Sport mega-events and emerging powers. The 
International Journal of the History of Sport 27(16–18): 3008–3025.
Crilley R and Chatterje-Doody PN (2020) Emotions and war on YouTube: affective investments in RT’s visual 
narratives of the conflict in Syria. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 33(5): 713–733.
Crilley R, Gillespie M, Vidgen B and Willis A (2020) Understanding RT’s Audiences: Exposure not endorse-
ment for Twitter followers of Russian state-sponsored media. The International Journal of Press/Politics. 
Epub ahead of print 16 December 2020. DOI: 10.1177/1940161220980692.
16 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 00(0)
Cull NJ (2008) Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 616(1): 31–54.
Dawson A (2018) These photos show how the World Cup is being used to whitewash everything terrible about 
Russia. Business Insider. Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/the-world-cup-is-whitewashing-
russian-atrocities-2018-6 (accessed 5 April 2020)
Feklyunina V (2016) Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian world (s)’. European Journal 
of International Relations 22: 773–796.
Fisher A (2020) Demonizing the enemy: the influence of Russian state-sponsored media on American audi-
ences. Post-soviet Affairs 36(4): 281–296.
Gillespie M (2006) Transnational Television Audiences after September 11. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 32(6): 903–921.
Gillespie M and Nieto McAvoy E (2016) Digital networks and transformations in the international news ecol-
ogy: A critique of agent-centred approaches to soft power. In: Chitty N, Ji L, Rawnsley GD, et al. (eds) 
The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power. London: Routledge, pp. 203–219.
Goscilo H (2013) Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon (Book, Edited). London: Routledge.
Grix J (2015) Sport Politics: An Introduction (Book, Whole. New York): Palgrave Macmillan.
Grix J and Kramareva N (2017) The Sochi Winter Olympics and Russia’s unique soft power strategy. Sport in 
Society 20(4): 461–475.
Grix J and Lee D (2013) Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states: The lure of the politics of attrac-
tion. Global Society 27(4): 521–536.
Grix J, Brannagan PM and Lee D (2019a) Emerging states and the shifting balance of global power. In: Grix J, 
Brannagan PM and Lee D (eds) Entering the Global Arena: Emerging States, Soft Power Strategies and 
Sports Mega-events. Mega Event Planning. Singapore: Springer, pp. 9–21.
Grix J, Brannagan PM and Lee D (2019b) Russia’s unique soft power strategy. In: Grix J, Brannagan PM and 
Lee D (eds) Entering the Global Arena: Emerging States, Soft Power Strategies and Sports Mega-events. 
Mega Event Planning. Singapore: Springer, pp. 53–68.
Gronskaya N and Makarychev A (2014) The 2014 Sochi Olympics and ‘Sovereign Power’. Problems of Post-
communism 61(1): 41–51.
Hudson V (2015) ‘Forced to Friendship’? Russian (Mis-)Understandings of soft power and the implications for 
audience attraction in Ukraine. Politics 35(3–4): 330–346.
Hutchings S (2020) ‘RT and the digital revolution: Reframing Russia for a mediatized world’. In: Byford A, 
Doak C and Hutchings S (eds) Transnational Russian Studies. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp. 
283–300.
Hutchings S, Gillespie M, Yablokov I, et al. (2015) Staging the Sochi Winter Olympics 2014 on Russia Today 
and BBC World News: From soft power to geopolitical crisis. Participations 12(1): 630–658.
Hutchison E (2016) Affective Communities in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jennings P (2018) World Cup 2018: Were ‘perfect hosts’ Russia misjudged? BBC Sport, 16 July. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/44787166 (accessed 29 April 2020).
Kazakov V (2018) Countering the doping and hooliganism scandals: Why Russia needs a good World Cup. 
The Conversation. Available at: https://theconversation.com/countering-the-doping-and-hooliganism-
scandals-why-russia-needs-a-good-world-cup-96042 (accessed 27 April 2020).
Kazakov V (2019) Representations of ‘New Russia’ through a 21St Century Mega-event: The Political Aims, 
Informational Means, and Popular Reception of the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic Games. Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation. The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK.
Kramareva N and Grix J (2018) ‘War and Peace’ at the 1980 Moscow and 2014 Sochi Olympics: The role of 
hard and soft power in Russian identity. The International Journal of the History of Sport 35: 1407–1427.
Kvale S and Brinkamn S (2009) Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing. London, 
SAGE.
Makarychev A and Yatsyk A (2020) The 2018 World Cup in Russia and Its Regimes of Visibility: The Cases 
of Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan. Journal of Sport and Social Issues 44(5): 375–396.
Miazhevich G (2018) Nation branding in the post-broadcast era: The case of RT. European Journal of Cultural 
Studies 21(5): 575–593.
Mickiewicz EP (2017) No Illusions: The Voices of Russia’s Future Leaders, with a New Introduction (New 
Book, Whole). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mueller S (2008) The nexus of US public diplomacy and citizen diplomacy. In: Snow N and Taylor P (eds) 
Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy. London: Routledge, pp. 121–128.
Muraviev AD (2018) Russia’s World Cup widely hailed as success, but will the good vibes last for Putin? 
The Conversation, 16 July. Available at: http://theconversation.com/russias-world-cup-widely-hailed-as-
success-but-will-the-good-vibes-last-for-putin-99208 (accessed 23 January 2021).
Crilley et al. 17
Nye J (2014) Putin’s Rules of Attraction. Project-syndicate.org. Available at: https://www.project-syndicate.
org/commentary/putin-soft-power-declining-by-joseph-s–nye-2014-12?barrier=accesspaylog (accessed 1 
December 12AD).
Nye JS (2008) Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 616(1): 94–109.
Orttung R and Zhemukhov S (2017) Putin’s Olympics: The Sochi Games and the Evolution of Twenty-first 
Century Russia (Book, Whole). London: Routledge.
Pamment J (2014) Articulating influence: Toward a research agenda for interpreting the evaluation of soft 
power, public diplomacy and nation brands. Public Relations Review 40(1): 50–59.
Rawnsley GD (2015) To know us is to love us: Public diplomacy and international broadcasting in contempo-
rary Russia and China. Politics 35(3–4): 273–286.
Rogers M (2018) Why this was the best World Cup in history. USA TODAY, 15 July. Available at: https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/martin-rogers/2018/07/15/world-cup-why-russia-staged-best-
tournament-history/786251002/ (accessed 23 March 2020).
Ronay B (2018a) How Football (Nearly) Came Home: Adventures in Putin’s World Cup. London: HarperCollins.
Ronay B (2018b) Schmeichel and Stan put a special gloss on RT’s World Cup coverage. The Guardian, 23 
June. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2018/jun/23/bad-hype-jose-mourinho-rt-
russian-tv (accessed 27 April 2020).
Rowe D (2004) Sport, Culture and the Media: The Unruly Trinity. 2nd ed. Issues in cultural and media studies. 
Maidenhead: Open University Press.
RT (2018a) Johnson says English visa apps for Russia 2018 fraction of 2014, despite no need for Brazil visa. 
Available at: https://www.rt.com/sport/421991-johnson-says-russia-2018-world-cup/ (accessed 30 April 
2020).
RT (2018b) The Peter Schmeichel Show. Available at: https://www.rt.com/shows/peter-schmeichel-show-rt-
sport/ (accessed 27 April 2020).
RT (2018c) The Stan Collymore Show. Available at: https://www.rt.com/shows/stan-collymore-show/ 
(accessed 27 April 2020)
RT (2018d) World Cup boosted ‘international people’s diplomacy’ – Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. 
Available at: https://www.rt.com/sport/434666-lavrov-world-cup-russia-peoples-diplomacy/ (accessed 
27 April 2020).
RT (2018e) World-renowned football coach José Mourinho signs with RT for special Russia 2018 World Cup 
coverage. Available at: https://www.rt.com/sport/420456-jose-mourinho-fifa-rt/ (accessed 27 April 2020).
Rutland P and Kazantsev A (2016) The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’. Journal of Political Power 9: 395–413.
Solomon T (2014) The affective underpinnings of soft power. European Journal of International Relations 
20(3): 720–741.
Stanley L (2016) Using focus groups in political science and international relations. Politics 36(3): 236–249.
Stanley L and Jackson R (2016) Introduction: Everyday narratives in world politics. Politics 36(3): 223–235.
Szostek J (2018) Nothing is true? The credibility of news and conflicting narratives during ‘information war’ in 
Ukraine. The International Journal of Press/Politics 23(1): 116–135.
Tenneriello S (2019) Staging Sochi 2014: The Soft Power of Geocultural Politics in the Olympic Opening 
Ceremony. Theatre Research International 44: 23–39.
Tomlinson A and Young C (2006) National Identity and Global Sports Events: Culture, Politics, and Spectacle 
in the Olympics and the Football World Cup. New York: SUNY Press.
Van Herpen MH (2015) Putin’s Propaganda Machine: Soft Power and Russian Foreign Policy (Book, Whole). 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Whittell G (2018) Towering skyscrapers, smooth new roads, Uber, Airbnb, Porsche and Jaguar dealers: this is 
Russia’s real revolution. The Times, 14 July. Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/towering-
skyscrapers-smooth-new-roads-uber-airbnb-porsche-and-jaguar-dealers-this-is-russia-s-real-revolution-
tfffz5f8g (accessed 23 January 2021).
Wintour P (2018) Boris Johnson compares Russian World Cup to Hitler’s 1936 Olympics. The Guardian, 
21 March. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/mar/21/boris-johnson-compares-
russian-world-cup-to-hitlers-1936-olympics (accessed 29 April 2020).
Yablokov I (2015) Conspiracy theories as a Russian public diplomacy tool: The Case of Russia Today (RT). 
Politics 35(3–4): 301–315.
